We investigate the pairwise correlations of 11 U.S. xed income yield spreads over a sample that includes the Great Financial Crisis of [2007][2008][2009]. Using cross-sectional methods and nonparametric bootstrap breakpoint tests, we characterize the crisis as a period in which pairwise correlations between yield spreads were systematically and signi cantly altered in the sense that spreads comoved with one another much more than in normal times. We nd evidence that, for almost half of the 55 pairs under investigation, the crisis has left spreads much more correlated than they were previously. This evidence is particularly strong for liquidity-and default-riskrelated spreads, long-term spreads, and the spreads that were most likely directly a ected by policy interventions.
Introduction
A persistent state of turmoil engulfed the international nancial markets { particularly U.S. equity, debt, credit, and derivatives markets { between the summer of 2007 and the late spring of 2009.
A number of papers (e.g., Caprio et al., 2010; Gal , 2010 ) have labeled such a state, characterized by unsettled and dysfunctional markets, as the \Great Financial Crisis" (GFC). There is now little doubt that the GFC ravaged U.S. xed income (debt and credit) markets in unprecedented ways (see Dwyer and Tkac, 2009 ). Using data from the epicenter of the crisis, a range of U.S. xed income (FI) markets, we pose two questions. First, can the GFC be truly seen as an approximately 2-year crisis episode that progressively abated to leave markets in a \normal" state similar to the one that had prevailed before 2007? Or second, to the contrary, was the GFC so pervasive that it left the relationships among di erent FI segments permanently altered?
More generally, some economic literature has investigated the fabric that turns a state of turmoil in the FI market into a persistent regime so severe to merit being dubbed a crisis, or even a \great" one nonetheless. A number of papers have focused on anomalies in the univariate dynamics of the rst (the level) and second (the volatility) moments of yield spreads (see, e.g., Fukuda, 2012;  Guidolin and Tam, 2010; Muir, 2012), sometimes also using event studies (see, e.g., Nippani and Smith, 2010). However, a multivariate approach focused on the comovement (e.g., correlation) patterns across FI markets should also contribute to a useful economic characterization of the Guidolin and Tam, 2010) . Usually such attempts have consisted of generic claims about the possibility that the e ects of the crisis were reabsorbed around mid-2009. In this paper, we develop a characterization of the GFC based on the multivariate behavior of a large set of yield spreads that o ers a novel perspective on two related issues: whether the GFC may be considered over and, in this case, when the crisis ended. 1 Given these premises and objectives, we systematically investigate the empirical behavior of pairwise correlations between 11 U.S. FI spreads over a sample of weekly data between 2002 and 2011. These spreads are distinct in terms of the securities or markets to which they refer, the maturity of the underlying securities, and whether they were a ected by speci c policy measures by the Federal Reserve and policy makers more generally (e.g., the Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) in reaction to the GFC. Our series measure yield spreads for a variety of instruments and markets, namely 3-month London interbank o ered rate (LIBOR) unsecured deposits, 3-month unsecured nancial and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), 5-year swaps, 5-year Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCorp) strips, 5-year commercial private-label commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), 10-year o -the-run Treasury securities, 20-year Moody's Baa-rated and Aaa-rated corporate bonds, 20-year Moody's Bbb-rated and Aa corporate bonds, and 30-year conventional xed-rate mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This list also includes two typical mortgage-related risk premia because the market identi ed as the catalyst of the nancial crisis is the U.S. mortgage market (see Frank and Hesse, 2009 ). 2 We use a mixture of cross-section econometric methods to test the existence of nonzero correlations for groups of spreads and test for breaks in the correlations between spreads. We generally reject both the null hypothesis of no cross-section correlation between spreads in all subperiods we consider and the null hypothesis of constant pairwise correlations over time. We provide a characterization of the GFC as a period during which pairwise correlations between yield spreads were systematically and signi cantly altered, with spreads comoving with one another much more strongly than in \normal" times. Our work is consistent with the intuition that the GFC was a period of structural and systematic alteration of correlations between spreads induced by a soaring exposure of the underlying securities to common crisis factors (such as declining \risk appetite", liquidity shortages, and funding problems for intermediaries; see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ).
Our results are considerably more intriguing than just a novel characterization of the GFC as a shock wave that has a ected spread correlations in addition to their means and volatilities.
Using nonparametric bootstrap methods, we nd evidence that the GFC has left the spreads much more correlated than before the crisis. This evidence appears to be particularly strong for three (occasionally overlapping, but clearly de ned) subsets of spread pairs, de ned according to spread features { i.e., characterized by liquidity problems, measuring default risk, or directly in uenced by policy interventions. Following the intuition provided by a simple and heuristic factor pricing to widen shortly before the onset of recessions and to narrow again before recoveries. Second, a good understanding of the dynamics of credit and liquidity risk premia incorporated in the prices of FI securities has a number of practical implications for portfolio managers and policy makers.
2 Data for a variety of mortgage rates are also available. We use yield spreads from two portfolios for which the construction of long time series is possible: a 5-year index of private-label Aaa-rated xed-rate CMBS yields computed by Bloomberg/Morgan Stanley and an index of 30-year xed-rate residential prime mortgage rates computed by Freddie Mac. Portfolio index series also exist for lower-rated private-label MBS and CMBS, but these time series are too short for use with the econometric methods applied in this paper. model, we determine which factors might have driven the correlations during and after the GFC.
First, we nd that the correlations between a majority of liquidity-related spreads increased so substantially during the GFC that they have not reverted to \normal" correlation levels in the aftermath of the crisis. This nding indicates that, for most spreads, their exposure to a liquidity factor has been substantially altered by the GFC. Second, almost two-thirds of the default risk spread correlations have remained altered even after the GFC, consistent with permanently altered exposures of default risk-related spreads to a common default risk factor. Third, about half of the correlations between spreads a ected by policy interventions have returned to levels that exceed the pre-crisis norm. Pairs of spreads that typically capture default risk (e.g., the Baa{Aaa corporate or the corporate junk spreads) were all simultaneously a ected by policy interventions. These spreads may have inherited patterns of behavior in the post-crisis period that re ect the possibility of future interventions. However, the higher correlation levels in the aftermath of the GFC can also be considered as indication that the vast array of policy measures deployed to counter the e ects of the crisis may have a ected the set of investment opportunities in structural and possibly undesirable ways. 3 Our ndings concerning the failure of many pairwise spread correlations to revert to their normal pre-GFC levels cast doubts on some of the recent literature that has concluded { perhaps too quickly and dismissively { that the crisis had been over by mid-2009. Even though means and volatilities of many spreads have indeed returned to their pre-crisis norm, permanently altered (higher) correlations between spreads may also have produced severe long-run e ects. In this sense, and possibly in the light of the sovereign debt crisis that has a ected the international xed income markets since 2010, the GFC may not really be over, yet.
A related paper by Dungey et al. (2012) is useful to illustrate the pros and cons of some of our methodological choices. They use a parametric, smooth transition structural GARCH model to endogenously detect simultaneous structural shifts in the relationships (dynamic correlations) among U.S. stocks, real estate, and Treasury securities. In addition to providing dating of the various stages of the GFC consistent with ours (see Section 4.3), a stark outcome of their empirical e orts is that nancial conditions in 2009-2010 were not back to where they were earlier in the decade. In particular, according to their results, the contemporaneous linkages between bond and stock markets have not returned to pre-crisis conditions. This nding suggests that the GFC may have left persistent e ects or, equivalently, that in some ways the GFC did persist at least throughout 2010. Although our focus is on a larger set of yields spreads, speci cally on the epicenter of the GFC (i.e., 11 di erent segments of the U.S. xed income market), it is worth noting that their di erent empirical application on a much smaller set of yields produces conclusions qualitatively similar to ours. Moreover, Dungey et al. (2012) work within a tight parametric framework that allows them to isolate the e ects of the correlation variations and rule out potential biases derived from contemporaneous instability in the volatilities. In fact, as shown by Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) , testing for changes in correlations in small samples may seriously a ect the power of the test. Dungey et al. (2012) avoid these issues by adopting a speci c parametric framework. In this paper, we implement a nonparametric bootstrap methodology to test for breaks in (signed) pairwise correlations, which also corrects for the small-sample biases discussed in Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) . Our objective is to characterize the evolution of correlations without imposing any speci c, and potentially misspeci ed, parametric structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a heuristic factor model that we use to interpret our empirical results. In Section 3 we sketch the methodological aspects of our empirical investigation. Section 4 is devoted to the description of the dataset, the summary statistics of the 11 spreads over 3 subsequent subsamples of the 2002-2011 period, and details on the dating of the GFC. We present our empirical results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
A Heuristic Factor Model
The following factor model provides a heuristic framework for the interpretation of the empirical results presented in this paper. Consider M yield spreads as follows: s i t with i = 1; 2; :::M , for which time series of length T are available, and assume that their dynamics follow, at least as an approximation, the factor structure
where F t is a K 1 vector of priced, standardized factor shocks (i.e., E t 1 [F t ] = 0) with a scalar unit covariance matrix; i t is a white-noise random variable that captures idiosyncratic risks (so that E t 1 [ i t j t ] = 0 8i 6 = j) and is independent of both the factors and the variables describing the state; and R p t (p = 1; 2; :::; P ) is an indicator that captures regime shifts in the factor exposures collected in the K 1 vector p;i . When the state is p, then R p t = 1 and R not p t = 0. E t 1 s i t is the conditional mean of the spread, for instance, determined by imposing no arbitrage restrictions. 4 Given E t 1 s i t , (1) determines the covariance matrix of the vector collecting the M spreads. As customary in the empirical literature on regime-switching regressions, we assume that R p t is conditionally uncorrelated with all the factors in F t , for p = 1; 2; :::; P . It follows that all linear in uences of the priced risk factors on yield spreads must be captured by F t only. In particular, 4 Such conditions are likely to involve the parameters of the regime-switching process unless this process is not priced because the switching risk is completely diversi able. Given our focus on correlations dynamics, this speci c aspect is irrelevant for the empirical analysis that follows. 
equation (1) implies that
for all possible pairs i and j. The presence of a common set of factors, F t , does not imply that all bivariate correlations will be identical because these will depend on the factor loadings 0 p;i and p;j in the various states. Three speci c cases are important for our purposes. First, when nancial markets are not subject to any regime shifts so that P = 1, then
and all correlations will be constant. In particular, if and only if
that is, a very special structure of factor loadings must apply for two spread series to be simultaneously uncorrelated.
Second, when there are only two possible, recurring regimes (which, for simplicity, we call \good" and \crisis") in the nancial markets, then 
Research Methodology
In the next two sections we sketch the methodological aspects of our paper. The extent of the cross-section correlation in a panel of 11 U.S. yield spreads, measured as described in Section 4 and in Guidolin and Tam (2010) , is examined using Ng (2006)'s uniform spacings methodology. Signed correlation changes between pairs of spreads are analyzed by a nonparametric bootstrap approach.
Further details are provided in the Appendix and the cited references.
Testing Cross-Section Correlation in a Panel of Data
We use the theoretical framework developed in Ng (2006) to test for and determine the extent of cross-section correlation in a data panel when the number of series and the speci c series that are correlated are unknown ex ante. The test is based on the probability integral transformation of the ordered absolute correlations of all pairs of time series. Standard tests for cross-section correlation in panels of data (e.g., Breusch and Pagan, 1980) are based on the null hypothesis that all pairs of time series exhibit no correlation against the alternative hypothesis that the correlation is di erent from zero for at least one of the time-series pairs. . 6 We partition the N sample absolute correlations into two groups: S for small (containing the . The number of correlations in S isK ^ N , whereas the number of correlations in L is N K = 1 ^ N . The strategy is to test whether theK absolute correlations in S are jointly zero. If the small correlations are statistically di erent from zero, then the absolute correlations in L must also be di erent from zero by construction.
A standardized spacings variance ratio (SV R) test statistic is computed to test the hypothesis of zero absolute correlation within each group. The test exploits the fact that the q-order uniform spacings is an integrated process. The test statistic, SV R (n), asymptotically (as n ! 1) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of no correlation in a subsample of absolute correlations of size n = N ,K, or N K , depending on which partition of the N sample absolute correlations is considered. 7 The SV R test statistic, which depends on the choice of the lag-length parameter q, is based on a transformation of the yield spread correlation spacings, which are exchangeable by construction { that is, the structure of dependence is the same for ( s s q ) for any s. This fact implies that the test can be run on any subset of the ordered correlations. If the data are 6 Ng (2006) explains why, if the underlying correlations are all zero, the uniform spacings, s s q , is a stochastic process that satis es statistical properties useful to build optimal tests.
7 Ng (2006) shows that the method also exhibits reliable small-sample properties. is a linear function of q, which translates the problem into testing the uniformity and nonstationarity of a speci c transformation of sample absolute correlations. 8 If the uniformity hypothesis on the s 's is rejected for S, testing whether the same hypothesis holds for L becomes uninformative. If the null of zero correlation is not rejected in S, we can apply the same methodology to partition S (second split) rst and obtain two additional subsamples, SS and SL.
The test can be run again to determine whether the observations in SS are uncorrelated. 9 
Testing for Structural Changes in Signed Correlation Coe cients
We use a version of a nonparametric bootstrap technique known as the iterated stationary bootstrap to test for breaks in (signed) pairwise correlations. For each pair of interest rate spreads, we bootstrap the di erence between their correlation coe cients over two subsequent subsamples.
The breakpoints, 1 < B < T , are exogenously given and determined by a variety of techniques that span both narrative accounts of the crisis and formal statistical tests. The details are given in The bootstrap distribution of c is obtained by resampling data blocks of random length from each pair of time series. Length is sampled from an independent geometric distribution whose expected value equals the expected block size. The original series is wrapped around a circle to ll blocks extending past the last observation. Optimal expected length is estimated through an inner 8 A simple quantile-quantile (q-q) plot of the s s may provide information about the extent of cross-section correlation in the data. If all correlations are nonzero, then the q-q plot will be shifted upward and its intercept will be larger than 0:5. If there is homogeneity in a subset of the correlations, then the q-q plot will be at over a certain range. If S is characterized by zero correlations while L is not, then in the q-q plot, the s 's would be expected to be approximately linear in s until s =K, then rise steeply for s >K, and eventually atten at the boundary of 1.
9 If there are too few observations in S, then the subsample SS may be too small for the test to be valid. Furthermore, if the SV R test is applied to the SS subsample after the S sample has rejected uniformity, then the sequential nature of the test should be taken into account when making inferences and computing p-values.
(smaller) bootstrap procedure. Bootstrap iterations and, when appropriate, a bias correction are adopted to estimate con dence intervals with improved accuracy. We use 1; 000 replications for the outer bootstrap, and 500 for the inner bootstrap. 10 The advantage of a bootstrap approach in our framework is that it is a more reliable method of testing for changes in correlation coe cients. Basically, statistical inference is often di cult with correlation changes (see Doyle and Faust, 2005 , for an explanation of some of the problems that arise when making inferences on correlation coe cients), especially if the data are time dependent and autocorrelated and the samples are small. In such situations, conventional asymptotics cannot provide good approximations for the distributions of estimators and test statistics, thereby rendering the nominal probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis and the true rejection probability very di erent from each other. When bootstrap techniques are used in alternative forms and under certain conditions, they represent a reliable way of determining the distribution of an estimator, reducing its nite-sample bias, and achieving signi cant asymptotic re nements in actual versus nominal coverage and size properties of con dence intervals and statistical tests. See the Appendix and De Pace (2013) for a thorough description of the motivation underlying this approach.
Data and Preliminary Evidence
We focus on a set of 11 alternative notions of xed income yield spreads. These spreads are distinct in terms of the securities/markets to which they refer, the maturity of the underlying securities, and whether they have been a ected by speci c policy measures that the Fed and policy makers in general have used in reaction to the prolonged nancial crisis over the 2007-09 period ( Table 1) .
The sources for all the data series are Haver Analytics and Bloomberg. As in many earlier papers Table 1 provides an overview of the economic nature of the 11 spreads analyzed in this paper; 6 spreads are classi ed as being directly a ected by the policy programs that were implemented by the Fed and the Treasury during the nancial crisis. The 3-month LIBOR { OIS spread has been potentially lowered by the range of swap arrangements among central banks. As far as the nancial nature of the spreads is concerned, Table 1 reports a classi cation for an additional 6 spreads as representative of liquidity risk premia { that is, the average excess return that investors require to hold less-liquid xed income securities. The rst of these spreads is the 11 The 3-month LIBOR is the interest rate at which banks borrow unsecured funds from other banks in the London wholesale money market for a period of 3 months. The overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate is the xed interest rate a bank receives in 3-month swaps between the xed OIS rate and a (compound) interest payment on the notional amount to be determined with reference to the e ective federal funds rate. 12 The Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCorp) was established in 1989 as the funding arm of the Resolution Trust Corporation to nance the recapitalization of the savings and loan industry. REFCorp issued $30 billion in debt securities between 1989 and 1991. Interest payments on REFCorp bonds are guaranteed by the U.S. government, and the principal is protected by the purchase of zero-coupon bonds with a face value equal to those of REFCorp bonds. While their risk-free credit status is the same as that of Treasury securities, they are much less liquid.
Classi cation of the Spreads
3-month LIBOR { OIS spread, consistent with the fact that this spread has been recently used as an indicator of the liquidity premium (see, e.g., Christensen et al., 2010). 13 The second and third spreads are the 3-month asset-backed (AB) and nancial commercial paper spreads; during the crisis, these were hit by a structural shortage of transaction volume. Such a shortage likely made these spreads as re ective of liquidity as of credit risk premia (see Adrian et al., 2010 ).
The 5-year REFCorp strip { Treasury spread is included in this classi cation because, given that The 10-year o -the-run { on-the-run Treasury spread is commonly interpreted as a measure of the market liquidity risk premium because two Treasury securities with identical maturities should imply identical credit risk and di er only for the higher \convenience yield" of a highly traded security over another security that is traded infrequently. Table 1 also classi es 8 of the 11 spreads investigated in this paper as re ecting credit risk-related factors, on the one hand, because our spreads are often computed with reference to Treasury yields.
The credit quality of the U.S. government is shared only by REFCorp bonds. However, Table 1 also lists 2 pure default risk spreads, the 20-year corporate Baa { Aaa and the 20-year Bbb { Aa junk spreads. On the other hand, given that a number of spreads re ect both liquidity and credit risk components, they are listed under both the \liquidity" and the \default" risk columns of the table. 14 Only 3 spreads, which in Table 1 are not reported to re ect a default risk premium, are indeed \pure" proxies of liquidity risk: the 3-month LIBOR { OIS, the 5-year REFCorp strip { Treasury, and the 10-year o -the-run { on-the-run Treasury spreads. Table 1 also presents a simple and objective classi cation of the spreads by distinguishing between short-and medium-long-term spreads. All xed income securities with a maturity of less than 18 months are labeled as short-term securities. Table 2 provides a comparison of the main summary statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, interquartile range, skewness, and excess kurtosis) of the 11 spreads over 3 subsequent subsamples 13 The nature of the LIBOR { OIS spread is not completely clear. At face value, the spread measures a credit risk premium; while the LIBOR, referencing a cash instrument, re ects both credit and liquidity risk, the OIS is a swap rate and as such has little exposure to default risk because swap contracts do not involve any initial cash ows. However, the typical default risk implicit in LIBOR rates is modest.
Summary Statistics
14 In the case of private-label Aaa CMBS, we compute a spread with reference to the closest (o -the-run) 5-year Treasury. The choice of an o -the-run Treasury allows us to attribute the CMBS spread to credit risk in the form of a higher probability of future defaults on the mortgages included in the securitized pools vs. Treasury securities. The standardization is applied using unconditional means and standard deviations over the full sample. A large positive (negative) standardized spread marks a large deviation in excess of (below) the mean by historical standards. Figure 1 consists of four di erent panels obtained by organizing the spreads using the same classi cation criteria as in Table 1 The lower-left plot of Figure 1 is devoted to the spreads that, according to the classi cation in Table 1 , were a ected by the policy interventions implemented during the crisis. The general patterns are similar to those outlined above. The 10-year o -the-run { on-the-run spread appears to be very volatile. Such volatility, however, stems from the mechanical fact that this spread is characterized by a low standard deviation. As such, deviations from the historical mean tend to be magni ed. With the only exception of the 5-year REFCorp strip { Treasury liquidity spread, most policy-a ected spreads tend to decline below their standardized norms starting in mid-2010 and remain at low levels until the end of the sample. 15 The lower-right plot in Figure 1 concerns the four short-term spreads; their overall patterns are similar to those just discussed.
We used standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests to show that it is sensible to analyze the interest rate spreads under the assumption of covariance stationarity (results unreported). 16 The number of lags to be included in the test regressions is selected by minimizing the Bayesian information criterion (the maximum number of lags is 12). Alternative, nonparametric Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests, which control for serial correlation, was also used. The rejection of the null hypothesis suggests covariance stationarity for the series under investigation. Our results show that yield spread series are generally covariance stationary. Using the PP test, in 8 of 11 cases the p-value is lower than 5%; in one case, the p-value is between 5% and 10%. The evidence favoring covariance stationarity of the spreads is largely con rmed by the ADF tests. 17 
Dating the Great Financial Crisis
The rst step to properly characterize the properties of cross-section spread correlations and their behavior over the cycle is to date the GFC. We approach this task in three di erent ways and obtain similar dates for the beginning and the end of the crisis from all three methods.
The rst approach is heuristic. We reviewed the literature on the GFC to detect systematic patterns in the reported dating e orts. Space constraints do not allow a thorough discussion of the details in the literature. However, even a super cial reading reveals that most papers and articles agree on early August 2007 as a potential starting date of the crisis. 18 In a few cases (e.g., series. Additionally, for all the spreads under consideration, conditioning on a rst break occurring 17 The only series for which it is di cult to reject the null of a unit root is the 1-year ARM { Treasury spread. As already argued, though, a unit root in a yield spread series is inconsistent with the interpretation of that spread as a risk premium. In this work we assume stationarity also for this particular real estate spread. All results concerning pairwise correlations involving this spread should be interpreted with some caution. The third approach is also based on formal statistical tests but is multivariate in nature and extends beyond the conditional mean of the spread series. We estimate two unrestricted vector autoregressions (VAR) of orders 1 and 2 using the levels of the 11 interest rates spreads over the full sample. Both VARs satisfy the conventional stability conditions that ensure stationarity, and are also consistent with our earlier stationarity results (unreported). Because of the univariate results outlined above, we follow the quasi-maximum likelihood approach described in Qu and Perron (2007) to estimate two breaks at unknown dates in the coe cients of the VARs and in the variance-covariance matrices of the errors of the two multivariate models. The errors are assumed to be normal. 20 The covariance matrices of the errors in the two models and the distributions of the regressors are allowed to change from one regime to the next. The error terms are allowed to be autocorrelated, but no prewhitening is applied when we construct the con dence intervals for the breakpoints. Under a VAR (1) 19 The second (third) break is obtained from an Andrews-Quandt test that conditions on the rst (second) break. When three breakpoints are estimated, there is evidence of a more recent break in 2011, which one may conjecture as being related to the European sovereign and bank debt woes. 20 We impose a value of 15% (73 weeks) for the trimming parameter (i.e., the minimum distance between the two breaks, between the beginning of sample and the rst break, and between the second break and the end of sample). 21 In the second case, under a VAR (2) Table 3 reports the signed correlations between spreads over the three subperiods isolated in Section careful analysis of the table reveals that in the second subsample, 53% of the correlations increase in absolute value. In particular, the absolute correlations between the spreads associated with long-term securities increase more frequently (71% of the possible 21 pairs). Conversely, after the GFC, 56% of the absolute correlations decline toward their pre-crisis values. This decline is particularly strong for long-term spreads (67% of the cases). Nevertheless, between the second and third subperiods, 61% of the 28 mixed absolute correlations (i.e., the absolute correlations involving spreads associated with short-and long-term bonds) decline. The standard deviation of the pairwise absolute correlations increases considerably during the GFC, but does not return to the low value of the rst subperiod in the aftermath of the crisis. Table 3 has some limitations. Despite the wealth of information that it contains, it does not allow determining whether there are signi cant changes in the overall degree of cross-spread correlation associated with the GFC. Table 4 proposes a battery of Ng tests based on the absolute correlations.
Empirical Results

Cross-section Correlation Tests
In the pre-crisis period, there is strong evidence that the hypothesis of no cross-section correlation may be rejected irrespective of the choice of the lag-order parameter q, with p-values ranging from 0.1% to 2.6%. The lower panel of Table 4 shows that this cross-section correlation is due to a large set of 49 pairs of spreads with large pairwise absolute correlations, which determine the rejection of the null hypothesis of no correlation at least for q = 2.
Although the statistical evidence for q = 2 is weaker, the null hypothesis of no cross-section absolute correlation is also rejected over the GFC period. This rejection is the result of a group of 48 correlations that are jointly and statistically di erent from zero for q = 4 and q = 6. In the aftermath of the nancial crisis, spreads are still correlated. In Table 4 the null hypothesis of no cross-section correlation can always be rejected independently of the choice of the parameter q. The null hypothesis of zero cross-section correlation for the group of large correlations is also rejected independently of q.
These results con rm a strong statistical evidence of non zero absolute correlations for the large majority of the 55 pairs of spreads. This nding is consistent with the hypothesis that 0 p;i p;j 6 = 0 in the heuristic factor model of Section 2 for at least some p = 1; 2; :::; P and for the majority of the spread pairs in the sample. Given these results, it is interesting to test whether 0 p;i p;j may be signi cantly di erent across alternative regimes, p = 1; 2; :::; P . In the next section we test whether the pairwise signed correlations between spreads signi cantly change between subperiods.
Evidence of Correlation Instability
The cross-section of spreads is characterized by massive and statistically signi cant correlations. These correlations decline after the crisis.
This evidence suggests the existence of two regimes (P = 2; a normal state and a crisis state) in the heuristic model of Section 2. In the normal regime, 0 p;i p;j tends to be low or even approximately zero for most pairs of spreads, i and j. During the crisis regime, however, 0 p;i p;j would massively increase. The GFC can be seen as a period of structural change during which correlations between yield spreads are systematically altered, possibly as a consequence of the soaring exposure of the securities underlying those spreads to common crisis factors, such as disappearing risk appetites, liquidity shortages, and funding problems for intermediaries often engaged in market-making activities in xed income markets.
Nonetheless, the evidence depicted in Figure 2 is not conclusive. First, it plots only the absolute values of pairwise correlations, discarding their sign. Second, the gure does not show whether the correlation changes are statistically signi cant. Third, the panels are so compact that cases in which correlations may have increased during the GFC and never reverted to normal levels could be hidden. Our dating of the crisis may a ect such potential instances. Alternatively, even though the crisis is correctly dated, a structural change in the relationship between pairs of spreads may have occurred in the interim. The second panel of Figure 3 shows a mild prevalence of declining correlations between the GFC period and the post-crisis sample. In particular, there is a dense cloud of a dozen spreads in the rst quadrant, whose large and positive correlations somewhat decline in the aftermath the crisis.
In the third panel, the analysis of the changes between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods shows that signed correlations increase over time for approximately two thirds of the spreads.
The second row of Figure 3 reproposes the elements presented in the rst row for which the null hypothesis of no correlation shift between two subperiods is rejected. That is, the 3 panels contain dots corresponding to the pairs of spreads i and j such that i 6 = j for which the null The three plots in the second row of Figure 3 remain however opaque as to which pairs of spreads are characterized by statistically signi cant correlation changes. We therefore use the results from tests reported in Table 5 Panel B in Table 5 shows the changes in correlations between the GFC and the post-crisis subsamples. Even though only 25 out of 55 correlations decline, 13 of these 25 do so in a statistically signi cant way. 22 For consistency with Figure 3 , we have also analyzed how correlations changed between the pre-and post-crisis periods. About half of the correlations signi cantly changed. The number of signi cant increases is 22, the signi cant declines are 5.
Which Spreads Were A ected by the Crisis and How?
The analysis presented in the previous sections does not shed light on the factors underlying the correlation instabilities detected. Figures 4 and 5 are devoted to this nal task. The three graphs in the rst row of Figure 4 plot the correlation combinations involving only the yield spreads with a liquidity premium (see the classi cation in Section 4.1). More precisely, these coordinates concern only correlations computed for spreads that are liquidity driven. The circled coordinates correspond to statistically signi cant correlation changes. Almost all the \liquidity correlations" increase from the pre-crisis to the GFC subsample and about half of them do so in a signi cant fashion. The correlations between liquidity-related spreads do not generally increase after the GFC; two of them signi cantly decline. These patterns are not found in mixed pairs, which include liquidity and non-liquidity yield spreads (detailed results are available upon request). The overall signed correlation increases are visible in the third plot (where the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods are considered), which shows a majority of signi cantly positive changes. Even though a 22 Of the 30 correlations that increase in the aftermath of the GFC, only 8 do so in a statistically signi cant fashion. liquidity factor is likely to have contributed to the correlation increases, there is weak evidence that such correlations reverted to their normal pre-crisis levels.
The second row in Figure 4 plots the correlation combinations between pairs of spreads that either represent or are heavily related to default risk. The dynamics are qualitatively similar to those already found, although they are quantitatively weaker because only a minority of the correlation changes are statistically signi cant. However, several correlations seem to continue drift upward even after the end of the GFC. As a result, almost two thirds of the default risk spread correlations do remain altered after the crisis. About a dozen of such changes are signi cantly positive and seemingly permanent. This nding suggests that more than two regimes might exist in the time evolution of the correlations (P > 2). In fact, in the post-crisis period we, in fact, fail to detect correlation levels comparable to the pre-crisis levels. The three middle graphs in Figure 4 may be considered as an indication of permanently altered exposures of default risk-related xed income spreads to a common default risk factor.
In the bottom row of Figure 4 we plot the correlations between pairs of spreads that were likely a ected by policy interventions during the crisis. The pattern of correlation { increases between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods, followed by correlation decreases in the post-crisis sample { is con rmed. Of note, in the rst panel only the positive correlation changes are sometimes statistically signi cant, in the second panel only the negative correlations changes are, in a few cases, signi cant. The third panel, which compares the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods, also reveals that while about 20% of the correlations a ected by policy interventions eventually decline below their pre-crisis levels, about half of them eventually return to correlation levels exceeding the pre-crisis ones. In fact, the pairs of spreads simultaneously a ected by policy interventions may have either inherited patterns of behavior in the post-crisis period that re ect the possibility of future additional interventions to correct market excesses (e.g., emergency liquidity programs such as the TAF and the TALF) or may have simply been a ected by some types of additional measures during the post-crisis period. The latter is indeed plausible because of the two waves of QE covered in our analysis. Based on the heuristic asset-pricing framework presented in Section 2, the nancial crisis might have determined the insurgence of a novel priced risk factor that not only tilted risk exposures such that 0 crisis;i crisis;j > 0 good;i good;j for most pairs of yields, but permanently increased such risk factors. 23 Figure 5 presents three sets of additional plots. The gure describes pairwise correlations for short-term spreads only (top row of scatterplots), concerning long-term spreads only (middle row of plots), and for mixed cases involving both short-and long-term spreads (bottom row of plots). 23 One may argue that if the nancial crisis has signi cantly and permanently a ected the correlations between spreads, then the policies implemented by the Fed and the Treasury must have had limited e ects at best. Yet, it is also possible that, just because these policy measures have been highly e ective, then the correlations of (some) pairs of yield spreads directly a ected by policy interventions may have not returned back to their pre-crisis levels.
Similar to (most) yield spreads a ected by policy interventions, the typical pattern is characterized by strong and often signi cant correlation increases between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods and between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The right plots for each set it is clearly show that the nancial crisis left a vast majority of yield spreads more correlated than before the crisis despite the mild (sometimes signi cant) correlation declines experienced by same pairs of spreads between the GFC period and the aftermath of the nancial turmoil.
Conclusion
In this paper we have systematically investigated the empirical behavior of the correlations of 11 Treasury security as the measure of the risk associated with Treasury securities during the nancial crisis. They hightlight that the spread decreases in level and becomes more volatile as the crisis progressed. Our work con rms the heuristic idea that the GFC was also a period of structural and systematic alteration of correlations induced by the common and soaring exposures of the securities underlying the spreads to common crisis factors (such as disappearing \risk appetites", liquidity shortages, and funding problems for intermediaries).
Our nonparametric bootstrap approach yields evidence that for almost half of the 55 pairs of spreads investigated, the GFC has left xed income spreads more highly correlated than before the crisis. This evidence appears particularly strong for three (occasionally overlapping, but clearly de ned) subsets of spread pairs. We used our ndings and the insights provided by a simple heuristic factor pricing model to determine which factors may have driven the correlations during and after the GFC. First, we found evidence for the majority of the liquidity-related spreads that their correlation increases during the GFC were so substantial that they have failed to revert to normal levels after the crisis. The exposure of most spreads to a liquidity factor appears to have been substantially increased by the GFC. Second, almost two-thirds of the default risk spread correlations have remained altered even after the GFC. This nding is consistent with permanently altered exposures of default risk-related spreads to a common default risk factor. Third, about half of the correlations a ected by policy interventions eventually reached levels exceeding the pre-crisis standards. This result may be deemed a powerful indication of the possibility that the broad array of policy measures deployed to counter the e ects of the crisis in xed income markets structurally a ected the set of investment opportunities. 
Appendix
In this appendix we describe the procedure we use to construct bootstrap distribution for c and to derive accurate con dence intervals for .
Constructing Stationary Bootstrap Distributions
Let be the parameter under investigation (a correlation coe cient between two time series), Given an estimate of the factor 1= , the bootstrap algorithm that generates the pair of stationary bootstrap time series replicas for A and B over the rst subsample, X 1 A;t and X 1 B;t , runs as follows: 
Estimating Accurate Con dence Intervals
Let X A;t and X B;t be two time series and I 0 ; X A;t ; X B;t ; X A;t ; X B;t the uncorrected bootstrap percentile con dence interval with nominal coverage probability for a change in the parameter , . X A;t and X B;t are two generic resamples with replacement from X A;t and X B;t . I 0 is constructed from sample and resample information. Usually, in empirical applications, the coverage probability of I 0 { namely, Pr ( ) = Pr n 2 I 0 ; X A;t ; X B;t ; X A;t ; X B;t o { di ers from . It follows that there exists a real number, % , such that Pr (% ) = . Let I 0 ; X A;t ; X B;t ; X A;t ; X B;t be a version of I 0 ; X A;t ; X B;t ; X A;t ; X B;t computed using information from X A;t , X B;t , X A;t , and X B;t . X A;t and X B;t are resamples with replacement of X A;t and X B;t . An estimate of Pr ( ) and X B;t given X A;t and X B;t is unavailable, an inner level of resamples (say, N B I resamples for each outer resample, n B O = 1; :::; N B O ) from X A;t and X B;t is used to outline the features of these distributions. 25 The bootstrap estimate for % is then the solution, b % , of the equation
When using discrete variables and discrete bootstrap distributions, an exact solution for this equation cannot always be found unless we use smoothing techniques. We choose the smallest value b % such that c Pr (b % ) is as close as possible to { i.e., such that c Pr (% ) is minimized over a grid of values and additional conditions de ning tolerance are satis ed (see De Pace, 2013 for additional details concerning the algorithm). The iterated bootstrap con dence interval for is then I 1 b % ; X A;t ; X B;t ; X A;t ; X B;t .
25 Bootstrap samples are drawn using the same nonparametric method in the main and nested bootstraps. 
